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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE
PROCESS AND THE PREVENTIVE
DETENTION OF JUVENILES
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Schall v. Martin,' the Supreme Court upheld a New York stat-
ute that provided for the preventive detention ofjuveniles accused
of a crime, who present a "serious risk" that they may commit an-
other crime before trial.
2
Schall v. Martin is the first time that the Court has sanctioned
detention of an individual prior to a finding of guilt for a purpose
other than to ensure that the person will appear at trial. 3 The deci-
sion is particularly disturbing for two reasons. First, a juvenile may
be detained based solely on the judge's prediction that the juvenile
is likely to commit a crime. Second, the statute lacks the procedural
requirements necessary to ensure fair application of the procedure.
4
This Note begins by explaining the New York procedure for
handling arrested juveniles.5 The Note then discusses particular as-
pects of Schall v. Martin, including the facts of the case 6 and the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. 7 Finally, this Note will analyze three
aspects of the Court's decision: the legitimate state interest,8 the
1 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
2 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983). The statute at issue in the
lower court cases was a forerunner of the current New York Family Court Act. See N.Y.
FAM. CT. Acr. § 739(a)(ii) (McKinney 1982). Article 3 of the Family Court Act became
effective July 1, 1983 and applies to all delinquency proceedings including appeals and
post-judgment proceedings. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 301.3(1) (McKinney 1983). Because
the preventive detention statutes are identical, the Court found that the case was not
moot. 104 S. Ct. at 2405 n.2 (citing Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43 (1969)).
3 See Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention ofJuveniles: A Principled Solution
to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1983). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of a District of Colum-
bia statute that permits the preventive detention of adults to protect society. See United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
4 See infra notes 102-56 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 106-30 and accompanying text.
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concept of punishment,9 and the due process implications of the
New York statute. 10
II. THE NEW YORK JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE
In New York, juveniles accused of conduct that would be a
crime if committed by an adult may be prosecuted as juvenile delin-
quents in family court." The New York Family Court Act estab-
lishes the framework for adjudicating juveniles delinquent.
12
Section 320.5(3)(b) of the Act provides for the pretrial detention of
a juvenile if "there is a serious risk that he may before the return
date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute
a crime." 13 An initial appearance before a family court judge takes
place soon after the juvenile's arrest. The judge typically reviews
the petition for delinquency, a recommendation on whether to de-
tain or release the juvenile, and statements by the juvenile and his or
her representatives. 14 Thejudge then decides whether to detain the
juvenile pending adjudication of the delinquency. A juvenile de-
tained under the statute is entitled to a probable cause hearing three
to six days after detention. A trial must follow three to fourteen
days after the probable cause hearing.' 5 If adjudicated a delin-
quent, the court will then hold a dispositional hearing to determine
what sentence to impose. The judge may choose from a variety of
sentencing alternatives, including suspending judgment, probation,
placement at home or with other people, placement in a treatment
center, or incarceration. 16 In making this sentencing decision, the
court considers the best interests of the juvenile and generally views
dentention as a "harsh solution."' 17 Frequently, the court finds that
the time served during the pretrial detention period is sufficient
9 See infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
11 United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aft'd, Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984). See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 30.00 (McKinney 1984).
12 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 302.1(1) (McKinney 1984). The New York Family Court Act
applies to juveniles between the ages of seven and sixteen who commit acts that, if com-
mitted by an adult, would constitute a crime. Id. at § 301.2(1).
13 Id. at § 320.5(3)(b).
14 Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing testimony of
Judge Cesar Quinones, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, at 463).
15 689 F.2d at 367. The trial generally begins three days after the filing of the peti-
tion against the juvenile unless the juvenile is charged with an act that would be a felony
if committed by an adult. In that case, the trial may be delayed for fourteen days. Id. at
367 n.5.
16 Id. at 368. Some of these alternatives are subject to the availability of space or
resources. Id.
17 Id. at 370.
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punishment and will not incarcerate the juveniles further. Also,
judges appear reluctant to sentence juveniles to additional time in a
detention facility when treatment facilities are unavailable.18 As a
consequence, the majority ofjuveniles detained under the New York
statute are released either before or immediately following the dis-
positional hearing.' 9
III. THE FACTS IN SCHALL V. MARTIN
On December 13, 1977, Gregory Martin was arrested and
charged with robbery, 20 assault,2 1 and criminal possession of a
weapon 22 after he allegedly struck another youth on the head with a
loaded revolver and stole the youth's jacket and sneakers.2 3 When
the police arrested Martin, he still possessed the gun. Because he
was fourteen years old, Martin came under the jurisdiction of the
New York Family Court. Pursuant to the Family Court Act, Judge
Ferrara of the Family Court held a hearing to determine whether
Martin should be detained before his trial.2 4 Although Martin had
no previous record, the judge ordered Martin detained under New
York's preventive detention statute.2 5 Judge Ferrara based his deci-
sion on three considerations: the crime occurred late at night, Mar-
tin possessed a weapon, and Martin had lied to police.
26
At a probable cause hearing on December 19, the court found
probable cause for all crimes charged. 27 From December 27 to 29
the court held a fact-finding hearing and found Martin guilty of rob-
bery and criminal possession of a weapon.28 At a dispositional hear-
ing on February 14, 1978, the court sentenced Martin to two years
probation.2 9 In all, Martin was detained under the New York statute
18 Id. at 371.
19 Id. at 369.
20 The adult criminal statute is N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 160.00, 160.05, 160.10, 160.15
(McKinney 1984).
21 The adult criminal statute is N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10 (McKin-
ney 1984).
22 The adult criminal possession statute is N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 265.01, 265.02 (Mc-
Kinney 1984).
23 Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2406 (1984).
24 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 696. For a discussion of the procedure under the New
York Family Court Act, see supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
25 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 696.
26 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2407.
27 Id.
28 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 696. The fact-finding hearing is analogous to a trial in an
adult criminal case. The juvenile is entitled to counsel, evidence may be suppressed,
and guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2407 n.8
(citing N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 330.2, 341.2, 342.2).
29 104 S. Ct. at 2407.
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for a total of fifteen days.30
While in preventive detention, Martin began a habeas corpus,
class action suit on behalf of "those persons who are, or during the
pendency of this action, will be preventively detained pursuant to"
the New York statute.3' Appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Mor-
gan joined the suit as named plaintiffs. 32 The class members sought
a declaratory judgment that the New York statute violates the four-
teenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses.
33
After certifying the class, the district court held that appellees
did not have to exhaust state remedies before petitioning the federal
courts for relief because New York's highest court previously had
rejected a challenge to this statute.34 The district court then re-
jected the appellees' equal protection claim. It held, however, that
because the pretrial detention of juveniles actually constituted a
"punitive measure," it violated the juveniles' due process rights. 35
The court ordered the release of all juveniles then held pursuant to
the statute.
36
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision.3 7 The
court held that the statute was used primarily to impose punish-
30 Id. Martin was detained from December 14 to December 29, the period between
the initial appearance and the end of the fact-finding hearing. Id.
31 Id. at 2408.
32 Id. The district court opinion discussed the case histories of the named plaintiffs
and 31 other members of the class. Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 695-700. The Supreme
Court opinion, however, mentioned only Martin, Rosario, and Morgan.
33 104 S. Ct. at 2408.
34 Id. See People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976). In Schupf, the New York Court of Appeals held the state statute
constitutional. The court found that the statute fulfilled two state concerns: to protect
society from crime and to shelter juveniles who are in need of special care. Id. at 687,
350 N.E.2d at 908, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 520. The court held that the statute, therefore, did
not violate equal protection or due process. Id. at 691, 350 N.E.2d at 911, 385 N.Y.S.2d
at 522.
35 United States rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aft'd, Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984). The district court held that the statute did not violate equal protection
under a rationality test. Id. at 706. The court refused to apply strict scrutiny because
youth is not an "invidiously discriminatory classification[]," and because the right to
personal liberty is not sufficient to warrant a strict scrutiny test. Id. In holding that the
preventive detention statute violated due process, the court stated that the procedure
lacked the fundamental fairness required in juvenile proceedings. Id. at 707. The court
enumerated several reasons for its finding: the judge's prediction is unreliable, id. at
707, there has been no finding of probable cause, id. at 714, and the detention consti-
tuted punishment, id. at 715.
36 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2408-09.
37 Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984).
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ment, and not merely for preventive purposes.38 Thus, the court
concluded that the New York statute was unconstitutional.
3 9
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 40 and subse-
quently reversed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist.4 1 Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion and was
joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
42
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Justice Rehnquist, in writing for the majority,43 stated that the
issue involved in this case was whether preventive detention of
juveniles comports with the due process requirement of fundamen-
tal fairness. According to the majority, resolution of this issue de-
pended upon answering two questions. First, does preventive
detention serve a legitimate state objective? Second, does the New
York statute provide adequate procedural protection to accused
juveniles?4
4
Although the Court recognized the juveniles' substantial inter-
est in freedom from institutional restraint,45 the Court held that the
pretrial detention ofjuveniles served the dual purpose of protecting
juveniles from the consequences of their criminal acts and protect-
ing society from the harm that juvenile delinquents may inflict.
46
These countervailing interests led the Court to conclude that pre-
ventive detention of juveniles "serves a legitimate regulatory pur-
pose compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings. '
47
The Court reached this conclusion by weighing a juvenile's in-
terest in liberty against the " 'compelling state interest' in protect-
ing the community from crime." 48 In addition to protecting the
community from crime, the Court found that the state has an inter-
38 Id. at 372.
39 Id. at 373.
40 103 S. Ct. 1765 (1983). Ellen Schall replaced Paul Strasburg as the Commissioner
of the New York City Department ofJuvenile Justice and thereafter became the named
appellant. Brief for the Appellant at I, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
41 See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 62-95 and accompanying text.
43 ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined
Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion.
44 104 S. Ct. at 2409.
45 Id. at 2410.
46 Id. at 2410-11.
47 Id. at 2412.
48 Id. at 2410.
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est both in protecting juveniles from injuring themselves while en-
gaging in criminal conduct and in preventing "the downward spiral
of criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child."
49
The Court held that these state interests outweighed the juvenile's
liberty interest. 50 Thus, preventive detention complies with the fun-
damental fairness requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court referred to the fifty state laws that allow some form of preven-
tive detention of juveniles, and the eight state courts that have up-
held these statutes.
51
Justice Rehnquist next addressed whether pretrial detention of
juveniles constitutes punishment. According to a previous Supreme
Court decision, if pretrial detention constitutes punishment, it
would violate juveniles' due process rights. 52 To conform with con-
stitutional requirements, the confinement must be compatible with
legitimate state regulatory purposes. 53 The Court concluded that
preventive detention of juveniles was not punishment because the
statute did not state that the detention was meant as punishment
and the circumstances of the incarceration did not constitute pun-
ishment. 54 The Court found it sufficient to rely on a case-by-case
adjudication of the validity of pretrial detention decisions because
the New York statute is not invalid on its face.55
The Court next examined the sufficiency of the procedural pro-
tections afforded juveniles and found them to be constitutionally ad-
equate. Appellees had argued that, at the very least, the Court's
decision in Gerstein v. Pugh56 required a finding of probable cause
before any incarceration. 57 The Court rejected this argument on
49 Id. at 2411.
50 See id. at 2412.
51 Id. at 2411-12. The Court acknowledged that the widespread use of the practice is
not conclusive as to its constitutionality. Id. at 2412. The Court used this information
as evidence of the "uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles
properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile .... " Id.
52 Id. at 2412 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979)).
53 Id. (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
54 Id. at 2413. The Court was convinced that preventive detention was not meant to
be punishment because the detention was limited in time, the juvenile was entitled to
probable cause and fact-finding hearings, and the juvenile cannot be detained for more
than 17 days under the statute. Id. In addition, the Court stated that the conditions of
confinement, whether in secure or nonsecure detention, reflect a regulatory rather than
a punitive purpose for the detention. Id.
55 Id. at 2415.
56 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
57 In Gerstein, the Court held that the fourth amendment requires ajudicial finding of
probable cause before a person may be subjected to an extended restraint of liberty. Id.
at 114. The Court did not impose a strict timetable, nor did it require the use of
"adversary safeguards" during the probable cause hearing. The Court noted that
although Gerstein arose in a fourth amendment context, "the same concern with 'flexibil-
[Vol. 75860
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two grounds. First, Gerstein provided states with the flexibility to ex-
periment with a variety of procedures to ensure conformance with
due process, and not with rigid, probable cause requirements. 58
Second, the Family Court Act provides more procedural protections
than the Court had required in Gerstein.59 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the procedures authorized by the New York statute are
constitutionally adequate under the fourteenth amendment and as
decided in Gerstein.60
The majority observed that the Court is neither a legislature
nor a committee formed to draft a model statute. Rather, the
Court's function should be restricted to reviewing the constitution-
ality of the New York statute. Under such a restricted review, the
Court found that the regulatory purpose of the preventive detention
ofjuveniles comports with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.61
B. THE DISSENT
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dis-
sented because he disagreed with the majority in both findings that
were essential to the decision. 62 First, the dissent disagreed that the
government objectives involved outweighed the adverse effect of in-
carceration on juveniles.63 Second, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's holding that the New York statute provides juveniles with
adequate procedural protections. 64
The dissent stated that the New York statute had to satisfy two
requirements to comply with fundamental fairness: the statute must
advance goals that justify the burdens it imposes on juveniles' con-
stitutional rights, and the statute must not punish juveniles. 65 The
dissent found that neither requirement was satisfied by the New
York statute.
Although the dissent characterized the test as a two part
analysis, the discussion focused mainly on the punishment aspects
ity' and 'informality,' while yet ensuring adequate predetention procedures, is present in
this context." 104 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
58 Id. at 2415.
59 Id. at 2416. The protections given to juveniles under the Family Court Act include
full notice of charges, a record of the hearing, representation by counsel, and a state-
ment of facts and reasons for the detention. Id.
60 Id. at 2417.
61 Id. at 2419.
62 Id. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 2420 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of the pretrial detention.66 First, the dissent discussed the burdens
the statute imposed on juveniles' constitutional rights. The dissent
indicated that it "is difficult to take seriously" the majority's claim
that preventive detention is merely a transfer of custody from parent
to the state.67 The dissent stated that "[t]he majority seeks to evade
the force . . . [of] the impact on a child of incarceration."
68
Juveniles, like adults, are subjected to stigmatization and restricted
freedom of movement as a result of their incarceration. 69 Further-
more, the dissent cited the district court opinion which found that
juveniles in secure detention were subjected to strip searches and
some of them were detained with juveniles who were institutional-
ized for long-term care.7
0
Second, the dissent agreed with the majority that the pretrial
detention ofjuveniles must not constitute punishment or it is consti-
tutionally infirm. The dissent disagreed, however, with the major-
ity's contention that a legitimate state objective would justify the
preventive detention.71 Nonetheless, the dissent found that the
statute does not advance a legitimate state objective, and thus, the
statute is unconstitutional because it imposes punishment prior to
the adjudication of guilt. 72 The dissent based this conclusion on
two grounds. First, when juveniles are preventively detained, the
state objectives of protecting the juvenile and society from juvenile
crime are at best minimally protected. Second, cases in which the
state objective is advanced cannot be distinguished from those situa-
tions where the detention served no purpose.
73
The dissent supported its conclusion by emphasizing three
66 Id. at 2423-25(Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2422 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5).
71 Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that although the phrase
"legitimate state objective" appeared in Wo4fish, the majority inappropriately relied on
the standard applied in that case. Id. at 2423 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Wofish
standard applies only to the conditions of confinement and not to the legitimacy of the
confinement in the first instance. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra notes 134-40
and accompanying text.
72 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2429-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent cited several
instances ofjudges using pretrial detention as a punishment. The record indicated that
many juveniles are released after they are found guilty because "the judge decides that
their pretrial detention constitutes sufficient punishment." Id. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (citing Martin, 689 F.2d at 370-71 & nn.27-28). Another judge admitted punish-
ing one of the juveniles in the sample by ordering him detained before trial. Id. at 2429-
30 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 708).
73 Id. at 2425 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the lower courts
found that "only occasionally and accidentally does pretrial detention . . . prevent the
commission of a crime." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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points. First, judges are incapable of determining which juveniles
would commit crimes upon release. 74 Second, the statute does not
differentiate between those juveniles likely to commit future of-
fenses and those who have been arrested for trivial offenses or have
no prior record.7 5 Third, the lower courts found no reason to be-
lieve that the detained juveniles were likely to commit crimes during
their period of release.76 In fact, many juveniles had been released
after arrest, and although they had not engaged in criminal conduct,
they were subsequently detained after their initial appearance and
before the fact-finding hearing.77 The dissent stated that "it is not
appparent why a juvenile would be more likely to misbehave be-
tween his initial appearance and his trial than between his arrest and
initial appearance.
78
The dissent reasoned that because of these infirmities, the
state's goal of protecting both the juvenile and society are fatally
undercut. Juveniles clearly do not benefit by this incarceration and
the state fails in its role as parens patriae.79 In addition, "the public
reaps no benefit from incarceration of the majority of the detainees
who would not have committed any crimes had they been
released."
80
The dissent also criticized the majority for authorizing a case-
by-case adjudication of pretrial detention situations. Because of the
limited time of incarceration, a particular juvenile's case would be
74 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the state of modem
psychology does not provide the tools for predicting human behavior. Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The district court stated that" 'no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised
which enable even the most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which
juveniles will engage in violent crime.'" Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Martin,
513 F. Supp. at 708).
75 Id. at 2426 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent referred to one case where a juvenile
was detained for five days for playing three-card monte. The petition against him was
later dismissed because the offense was not against the law. Id. at 2426 n.21 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 698-99).
78 Id. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile court system was created to help
and to rehabilitate the delinquent child. Theoretically, the child's natural parents have
failed in their role as parents, so the state intervenes to reform the child. See Comment,
Waiver in Indiana-A Conflict with the Goals of the Juvenile Justice System, 53 IND. L.J. 601
(1978); see generally Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
80 104 S. Ct. at 2427 (MarshallJ., dissenting). Justice Marshall was particularly dis-
turbed that under the parens patriae doctrine, the juvenile justice system is meant to help
juveniles, yet the preventive detention statute harms more juveniles than it helps. Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Most juveniles detained under the statute are not helped be-
cause they would not have committed crimes had they been released. These same
juveniles are deprived of their liberty and may be stigmatized by the label of "delin-
quent." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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moot before the constitutionality of the statute could be chal-
lenged.8 1 In addition, detainees seeking to challenge the constitu-
tionality of their detention would have to demonstrate that, if they
had been released, they would not have committed a crime and
therefore they were unconstitutionally detained. 82 The dissent con-
cluded that "to protect the rights of a majority of juveniles whose
incarceration advances no legitimate state interest, § 320.5(3)(b)
must be held unconstitutional 'on its face.' "8,3
Next Justice Marshall criticized the statute's lack of adequate
procedural safeguards.8 4 The statute provides judges with no gui-
dance to determine what evidence they should consider when decid-
ing whether to incarcerate a juvenile, and the statute does not
require judges to consider the juvenile's past criminal record or the
severity of the crime.8 5 Thus, because the statute fails to provide
direction, judges are vested with unbridled discretion when making
pretrial detention decisions.
8 6
In addition, the dissent found that the procedural protections
provided by the New York statute would fail to prevent the errone-
ous detention of juveniles who do not constitute a threat to soci-
ety.8 7 The dissent based this conclusion on the three part test
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge.88 First, because personal liberty is
81 Id. at 2428 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent also claimed that the detained
juveniles would have difficulty obtaining standing to seek equitable relief. Id. at 2428-29
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (comparing INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 n.4 (1984)
(plaintiffs' allegation of an ongoing policy by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
of entering their workplace to determine whether illegal aliens are present sufficient to
establish standing), with City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983) (plaintiff
failed to demonstrate case or controversy because he did not allege either that all police
officers always apply chokeholds to arrestees, or that the city authorized such conduct)).
83 Id. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). This leads to the possibility that juveniles will be
detained "under circumstances in which no public interest would be served by their
incarceration," id. at 2430-31, and that the process is arbitrary and infringes on funda-
mental rights, id. at 2431 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved the procedure a state agency must follow
to terminate disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The Mathews
Court articulated three factors to consider to comply with due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
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at stake, the dissent found that the Court should require adequate
procedural protections. Second, there is a serious risk that juveniles
will be mistakenly detained. 89 Third, the administrative burdens
that would result from additional protective devices would be
insubstantial.
90
Finally, Justice Marshall stated that he would have struck down
the New York preventive detention statute on vagueness grounds. 9'
He analogized the Schall v. Martin situation to cases where the Court
has struck down city ordinances that gave officials "standardless dis-
cretion" to impose sanctions that violate procedural due process.92
Justice Marshall found that these precedents compel the rejection of
the present situation where the "absence of meaningful guidelines
creates opportunities for judges to use illegitimate criteria when de-
ciding whether juveniles should be incarcerated pending their
trials."
93
In conclusion, Justice Marshall feared that the statute is "bound
to disillusion its victims regarding the virtues of our system of crimi-
nal justice" because "no public purpose advanced by the statute [is]
sufficient to justify the harm it works." 9 4 Although the state has the
power and the responsibility to protect children, Justice Marshall
emphasized that the Court had upheld a statute that is overwhelm-
ingly detrimental to a majority of the juveniles affected by the
statute.95
V. ANALYSIS
The philosophy underlying the juvenile justice system has been
to rehabilitate rather than to punish youthful offenders. 96 Since Illi-
nois established the first juvenile court in 1899, every state has
89 104 S. Ct. at 2431 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2432-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), where the Court struck down a local vagrancy ordi-
nance on the grounds that the ordinance placed too much discretion in the hands of
police. Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (due process clause prohibits conditioning the right to marry on the fulfillment of
child support obligations); Staub v. City of Baxley,'355 U.S. 313 (1958) (fourteenth
amendment does not allow city to require members of an organization to obtain permit
to solicit new members).
92 104 S. Ct. at 2433 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 402 n.4 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
93 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 Peuler,Juveniles Tried as Adults: Waiver ofJuvenile Court Jurisdiction, 3 J. CoNTEMP. L.
349, 349 (1977). For a general discussion of the history of the juvenile justice system,
see Comment, supra note 3, at 98-101.
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adopted a separate set of proceedings for juvenile offenders. 97 The
state often has assumed the role of parens patriae and has adopted a
variety of procedures whereby juveniles may be rehabilitated.
These sentencing alternatives range from court supervision of a ju-
venile, to transfer of custody to a foster home or other facility
designed for juvenile offenders. 98
If parents fail in their supervisory role and their children are
found to be delinquent, the state may intervene as parens patriae and
assume custody of the child.99 Because juvenile courts act in the
child's best interests and merely transfer custody from the parents
to the state, the proceedings are viewed as civil rather than criminal
in nature. 100 Thus,juveniles are not entitled to assert all the funda-
mental constitutional rights that are available to adults in criminal
proceedings.' 01
In juvenile proceedings, juveniles may assert only the funda-
mental right to fair treatment afforded by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 10 2 This fundamental fairness standard
has been used to decide many due process challenges of juvenile
court proceedings. 10 3 It remains the only basis on which a juvenile
may challenge the constitutionality of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding.
In Schall v. Martin, the Court determined that the fundamental
fairness of the New York statute may be resolved by considering
three issues. First, to comport with fundamental fairness, the state
may justify the deprivation of a juvenile's liberty only in the pres-
ence of a legitimate state objective. Second, according to the
97 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
98 Peuler, supra note 96, at 349. Juveniles may remain with their families while under
court supervision or they may be placed in an institution for juvenile delinquents. Other
alternatives include probation or temporary transfer of custody to an individual or
agency capable of providing appropriate care for juveniles. Id.
99 Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
100 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
101 See Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a
Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 656 (1980); see also McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1971) (plurality opinion).
102 Kent, 383 U.S. at 355 (citing Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 274 F.2d
556 (1959)). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "No state shall. . . deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
103 See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (due process protects juveniles
against double jeopardy); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (due process
does not include right to jury trial for juveniles); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due
process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due
process requires written notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrim-
ination, and right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses).
866 [Vol. 75
PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF JUVENILES
Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 10 4 the pretrial detention is consti-
tutionally infirm if it constitutes punishment. Finally, the statute
must provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that the
statute does not violate the constitutional rights of detained
juveniles. 10 5
A. THE LEGITIMATE STATE OBJECTIVE
The majority opinion emphasized society's "'legitimate and
compelling state interest' in protecting the community from
crime,"' 0 6 and only cursorily mentioned the juvenile's interest in
freedom from restraint.10 7 The Court then concluded that preven-
tive detention ofjuveniles is justified on the grounds that it protects
juveniles from the consequences of their own folly and protects so-
ciety from the harm that young offenders may cause. Thus, the
Court found that "the practice serves a legitimate regulatory pur-
pose compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the
Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings."' 0 8
The Court mentioned only two reasons to justify its conclusion
that pretrial detention of juveniles comports with due process.
First, the Court found that juveniles have only minimal liberty inter-
ests, for "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of cus-
tody."' 1 9 Although the juvenile justice system traditionally was
based on this concept of a transfer of custody, the logic of adhering
to this rationale has been questioned for years. 1 0 Parental "con-
finement" cannot seriously be compared to institutional confine-
ment where juveniles may be strip searched and forced to wear
104 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
105 Both the majority and dissenting opinions mentioned only two issues to resolve.
The majority combined the legitimate state objective and punishment issues, Martin, 104
S. Ct. at 2409, most likely because of its contention that the test in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979), states that incarceration constitutes punishment in the absence of a
legitimate government objective. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2412-13. By finding a legitimate
state objective, therefore, the majority automatically resolved the punishment issue.
The dissent, however, treated the questions of punishment and legitimate state objec-
tives as two separate issues. Id. at 2423, 2425 (Marshall,J., dissenting). For clarity these
two issues will be similarly treated here. The dissent did not mention procedural issues
as part of a test to be applied in this case. The fact that the dissent ultimately addressed
this issue, however, indicates its importance to the case. See id. at 2430 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
106 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2412.
109 Id. at 2410.
110 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 ("[I]he constitutional and theoretical basis for this




institutional clothing and follow institutional regimen.1",
Second, the Court relied on the fact that every state allows pre-
trial detention of juveniles accused of crime, and that some states
have expressly upheld their state statutes permitting preventive
detention. 112 Although the Court recognized that uniform state
practice does not indicate that the action conforms with due pro-
cess, the Court cited these statutes and cases to indicate "the uni-
form legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles
properly promotes the interests both of society and the
juveniles."113
The majority does not articulate the relevance of this uniform
legislative judgment. Instead, the majority seems to use this infor-
mation as evidence of the legitimacy of its assumption that preven-
tive detention of juveniles protects society. Yet no empirical
evidence supports this assumption.1 4 The district court found that
trained criminologists could not predict which juveniles would en-
gage in crime, 1 5 and one expert witness testified that judges could
predict future criminal conduct only four percent better than
chance."X6 Evidence also indicates that psychologists are unable to
accurately predict future criminal conduct. 117 Yet the New York
statute requires judges to determine whether juveniles will commit a
crime during the three to fourteen days following their initial ap-
pearance. 1 8 Certainly, the prediction of future criminal conduct,
especially for such a short period of time, is speculative at best."19
111 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5.
112 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
113 Id. at 2412.
114 Id. at 2425-26 n. 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (collecting authorities). See, e.g., AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 27-28 (1974);
Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Con-
vincing Evidence, 29 RUrGERS L. REV. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric
Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and
the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Schlesinger, The Prediction of Dangerousness in Juveniles: A Replication, 24 CRIME & DELINQ.
40, 47 (1978); Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent
Offender, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 229-31 (1978); Wenk, Robinson & Smith,
Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 401 (1972); Preventive Detention: An
Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (1971).
115 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 708.
116 Id.
117 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
119 See Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2425-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A particularly interest-
ing study resulted from the Supreme Court decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966). In Baxstrom, the Court held that prisoners confined in Department of Cor-
rections hospitals after their prison terms expired must be released or be civilly commit-
ted. Id. at 115. The decision affected 969 patients whom psychiatrists had determined
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Although the Supreme Court has upheld the use of psychologi-
cal predictions of dangerous behavior in various contexts, never
before has the Court sanctioned the confinement of an individual
before an adjudication of guilt based on a mere prediction that the
person will commit a crime.' 20 Previously, the Court has sanctioned
the use of predictions of future dangerous conduct in limited con-
texts. Schall v. Martin, however, marks the first time that the Court
has allowed a judge to make an independent and untutored predic-
tion of dangerousness. 1
21
The Court has upheld the use of predictions of dangerous con-
duct in a number of other situations. Injurek v. Texas,' 22 the Court
upheld a state death penalty statute that allowed the jury to consider
the likelihood that the defendant would engage in future anti-social
conduct. 123 The Court held that parole boards qualify.as predictors
of dangerous conduct in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates'24 and
Morrissey v. Brewer.' 25 In both cases, the Court approved of parole
board decisions that necessarily involved predictions of future dan-
gerous conduct.'
26
were too dangerous or too mentally ill to be released or transferred. Despite these pre-
dictions, one year after the patients were transferred following Baxstrom, 147 had been
discharged and the 702 who remained presented no special disciplinary problems. Only
seven required recommitment to a Department of Corrections hospital (figures exclude
deaths, transfers, etc.). See Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 Am. J.
PSYCHATRY 974 (1968). After several years, twenty-seven percent of the patients had
been released and only nine had been convicted of crimes. See Ennis & Litwack, supra
note 114, at 712 (citing Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActiv-
ity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 Am. J. PSYCHiATRY 304 (1972)).
120 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) (Court held psychiatrist could testify
at penalty phase of capital case regarding likelihood that defendant would engage in
future criminal conduct); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
(Court held Nebraska procedure for granting parole satisfied due process require-
ments); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (Court upheld Texas death penalty statute
that required jury to decide whether defendant would commit future acts of violence);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (Court held that parole board must follow
minimum due process requirements when revoking parole).
121 In Greenholtz and Morrissey, the state parole boards rendered decisions regarding
parole. The Court held that the procedural safeguards imposed by the board in Green-
holz were adequate for deciding whether to grant parole, Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 16. The
Court established guidelines for parole boards to ensure compliance with due process
when revoking parole in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89. InJurek, the Court upheld the
Texas capital sentencing scheme that allowed jurors to consider whether the defendant
was likely to engage in future violent behavior. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
122 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
123 Id. at 276.
124 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
125 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
126 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. In Greenhoh, the Court upheld
the parole board decision. Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 16. In Morrissey, the Court found the
record inadequate to decide the constitutionality of the parole board's process. Morris-
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Most recently, in Barefoot v. Estelle,' 27 the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the testimony of a psychiatrist at the penalty phase
of a capital case. The psychiatrist's testimony indicated that the con-
victed murderer was likely to engage in future violent acts. The
Court held that the adversary nature of the proceeding permitted
the defendant to rebut the claims of the testifying psychiatrist.'
28
Two factors distinguish the present situation from Barefoot. First, in
Schall v. Martin, the judge is making the prediction of future criminal
conduct, and, as indicated above, there is no evidence that judges
are qualified to perform this function.129 Second, the Court in Bare-
foot upheld the psychiatrist's testimony because the expert was sub-
ject to cross-examination and the presentation of contrary
evidence. 130 Clearly, a judge's opinion that a juvenile presents a
"serious risk" of committing a crime before trial is not subject to the
same protections afforded by the adversarial process. Thus, Barefoot
does not justify the Court's decision to uphold the judge's predic-
tion of future dangerous conduct in Schall v. Martin.
Overall, there is no empirical evidence that justifies the major-
ity's conclusion that the preventive detention of juveniles protects
society. The assertion of this government interest alone, without
more, should not be sufficient to deprive juveniles accused of crime
of their right to freedom.
B. PUNISHMENT
In Bell v. Wolfish, 13 1 the Supreme Court established the condi-
tions under which an adult may be preventively detained before
trial. Wolfish involved the confinement of pretrial detainees who
were held to ensure their presence at trial. 132 There was no ques-
tion that the adults were constitutionally detained in Wolfish. The
issue in Wolfish was whether the administrative rules imposed on the
pretrial detainees constituted punishment before the adjudication of
sey, 442 U.S. at 490. The Court did, however, establish minimum due process require-
ments that implicitly allow for predictions of future conduct. Id. at 489.
127 103 S. Ct. at 3383 (1983).
128 Id. at 3397.
129 See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
130 Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3396.
131 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
132 Id. at 540. This rationale is an established justification for detaining an individual
prior to a finding of guilt. See, e.g., Exparte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835). A
court may not set bail higher than an amount reasonably necessary to ensure the ac-
cused's presence at trial. United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926) (Butler,
J., as Circuit Justice). The Court has never decided whether adults may be preventively
detained if it is probable that they may commit crimes before their trials.
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guilt.13 3
The Court in Wofish found that punishment may take three
forms: a statute that expressly states that an action is punish-
ment;13 4 state action that is arbitrary or purposeless; 135 and state
action that does not fulfill a legitimate state objective.13 6 Applying
this test to the facts in Wolfish, the Court found that the pretrial de-
tention of adults under these conditions did not constitute punish-
ment because there was no express intent to punish the adults, nor
was the action so arbitrary or purposeless that a court could infer
that the state action was punishment. 137 The Court held that the
rules imposed on the inmates fulfilled a legitimate regulatory pur-
pose.138 The rules were imposed upon adults who were constitu-
tionally detained to ensure the safety of other prisoners and
guards.'3 9
In contrast, the issue in Schall v. Martin was not merely whether
the conditions of confinement constitute punishment, but rather
whether the juveniles may be confined prior to trial at all. The Wolf-
ish definition of punishment is inadequate to resolve this issue be-
cause the Wo4lsh definition should apply only to the conditions of
confinement for those who are constitutionally detained. 40 A legiti-
mate regulatory purpose alone should not be sufficient to categorize
the preventive detention of juveniles as non-punitive because indi-
vidual liberty is at stake. Thus, the Court's finding of a regulatory
purpose should not be sufficient to preventively detain juveniles.
Although the majority found support in the record for its prop-
osition that "conditions of confinement also appear to reflect the
regulatory purposes relied upon by the State,"' 14 1 the dissenting
opinion makes a much more convincing argument that, at least in
some cases, the conditions to which juveniles are subjected in pre-
trial detention are inadequate. Preventively detained juveniles may
be incarcerated with juveniles who have been found guilty of com-
mitting crimes, and preventively detained juveniles often are sub-
jected to strip searches. 142 In addition, the procedural aspect of the
statute provides no guarantee that the reasons for confinement will
133 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 523, 534.
134 Id. at 538.
135 Id. at 539.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 561.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 558-59, 561.
140 See Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2423 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 2413.
142 Id. at 2422 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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be ascertained adequately.1 43 When these factors are weighed
against the speculative nature of the protection afforded society, 1 44
the conclusion that this state action constitutes punishment is
unavoidable. 145
This conclusion is supported further by evidence in the record
that indicates that judges use the New York statute as a punitive
measure. For example, the district court found that the family court
may incarcerate juveniles in a facility closely resembling a jail and
that judges frequently order that juveniles be detained with other
juveniles who have been found to be delinquent. 146 In addition,
juveniles often are released after being detained under the New
York statute because "the judge decides that their pretrial detention
constitutes sufficient punishment."' 147 Thus, despite the Supreme
Court's decision that this conduct does not constitute punishment,
family court judges clearly apply the law in this unconstitutional
manner.
C. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
The majority in Schall v. Martin found that the New York statute
provided adequate procedural safeguards to avoid arbitrary applica-
tion of preventive detention.148 A closer examination of the statute,
however, reveals two serious inadequacies. First, the statute
presents the family court judge with unbridled discretion in deter-
mining to whom the statute will apply. The problem arises because
the statute fails to provide judges with guidance as to what factors to
consider when imposing preventive detention on juveniles. Also,
because future conduct cannot be predicted, judges are unable to
apply the "serious risk" standard. Second, the New York statute
provides no standard of review for appellate courts to apply in ap-
peals of preventive detention decisions.
According to the statute, judges must determine that juveniles
pose a "serious risk" of committing a crime between the initial ap-
pearance and their probable cause hearing to warrant their deten-
143 See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the procedural
infirmities of the statute.
144 See Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2427-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 112-
30 and accompanying text.
145 Cf. Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 See Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5.
147 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2429 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Martin, 689 F.2d at 370-
71 nn.27-28). This conclusion was based on testimony by Judge Quinones, a family
court judge, and was also conceded by appellants' counsel. Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2417.
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tion.149 Studies indicate that such determinations cannot be made
by either psychiatrists orjudges. Forjudges to find that ajuvenile's
conduct may constitute a serious risk to the public, the judge neces-
sarily must predict the juvenile's future conduct. It is precisely this
type of prediction that psychiatrists have found is impossible to
make.150 Thus, the statute fails to provide adequate procedural pro-
tections because a juvenile's incarceration is based only upon a
judge's prediction that the juvenile may engage in criminal conduct.
Similarly, because the statute fails to provide a set of guidelines
for judges to apply, judges may make preventive detention decisions
based on any criteria they wish to use. Although judges may con-
sider a juvenile's past criminal behavior, the child's home environ-
ment, and the seriousness of the crime of which the juvenile is
accused, nothing requires judges to consider these factors.151
Previously, the Court has adhered to a standard that would pre-
vent government officials from exercising "unfettered discretion in
making decisions that impinge on fundamental rights." 152 The
Court found that this unfettered discretion "'permits and encour-
ages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.' ",153
The same concerns that are at issue in these previous cases are at
issue in Schall v. Martin because the judge is granted absolute discre-
tion without statutory guidance. Although these previous cases,
such as Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville15 4 and Staub v. City of
Baxley, 155 involved public officials other than judges, there is no rea-
son judges should be granted unfettered discretion to make predic-
tions that are beyond their expertise.
149 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
150 See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
151 Martin, 104 S. Ct. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact, the lower court opin-
ion indicated that one judge chose to incarcerate ajuvenile because" '[w]e are living in
a jungle, and it is time that these youths. . . pay the penalty.'" Id. at 2430 n.29 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (quoting Plaintiffs' Exhibit 42 at 11). Nothing in the statute pre-
vents a judge from so incarcerating a juvenile.
152 Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 170 (1972)). The dissent analogized the situation in Schall v. Martin to that in
Papachristou where the Court invalidated a local vagrancy ordinance on vagueness
grounds. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court in Papachristou held that the statute at
issue was unconstitutional and emphasized the "unfettered discretion it place[d] in the
hands of the. . . police." Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168.
The dissent also analogized the Martin situation to the first amendment context
where the Court has invalidated local ordinances that conditioned speech on the " 'un-
controlled will of an official.'" 104 S. Ct. at 2432 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)). See also Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
154 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
155 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
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Furthermore, the New York statute provides no standard of re-
view for appellate courts to apply in appeals of preventive detention
decisions. Just as the Court held in Furman v. Georgia1 56 that the
state death penalty statute did not provide a standard of review, and
therefore was unconstitutional, the Court in Schall v. Martin should
have similarly held that the inadequate standard of review in the
New York statute rendered it unconstitutional. Appellate courts
may be unable to hold that family court judges acted arbitrarily
when the statute does not require a judge to consider particular fac-
tors. Thus, the Court should have found that the New York statute
is unconstitutional because of its failure to provide a standard of
review for appellate courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Schall v. Martin, the Court for the first time permitted the
states to restrain liberty for a reason other than to ensure the ac-
cused's presence at trial. The basis for this confinement is a judge's
independent determination that a juvenile is likely to engage in
criminal behavior prior to trial. A prediction of short term anti-
social conduct is beyond the expertise of judges and should not be
allowed. Although predictions of future dangerous conduct have
been allowed in other cases, these predictions have never before
been implemented in a situation before the adjudication of guilt.
Although the holding in Schall v. Martin applies only to
juveniles and only for a short period of time, it is the first step to-
ward future restraints of liberty before the adjudication of guilt.
The Court next may be asked to decide whether similar restraints of
liberty are appropriate for adults, and Schall v. Martin may serve as
convincing precedent in any such future case.
LEE A. WEISS
156 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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